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A constructive and unifying framework for
zero-bit watermarking
Teddy Furon
Abstract
In the watermark detection scenario, also known as zero-bit watermarking, a watermark, carrying no hidden
message, is inserted in a piece of content. The watermark detector checks for the presence of this particular weak
signal in received contents. The article looks at this problem from a classical detection theory point of view, but
with side information enabled at the embedding side. This means that the watermark signal is a function of the host
content. Our study is twofold. The first step is to design the best embedding function for a given detection function,
and the best detection function for a given embedding function. This yields two conditions, which are mixed into one
‘fundamental’ partial differential equation. It appears that many famous watermarking schemes are indeed solution
to this ‘fundamental’ equation. This study thus gives birth to a constructive framework unifying solutions, so far
perceived as very different.
Index Terms
Zero-bit watermarking, Pitman-Noether theorem, detection theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past six years, side-informed embedding strategies have been shown to greatly improve watermark decoding.
They exploit knowledge of the host signal during the construction of the watermark signal. The theory underlying
these side-informed schemes was presented in the famous paper “Writing on Dirty paper” by M. Costa in 1983. Our
work gives some theoretical aspect of the achievable performances when using side-information at the embedding
side, as in Costa’s correspondence, but for the watermark detection problem (a.k.a. zero-bit watermarking [1, Sect.
2.2.3]). This surprisingly received almost no study compared to the issue of watermark decoding, although it is
perceived as a non trivial problem [2], [3]. Some other exceptions are works from M. Miller et al. (embedding
cone) [4], JANIS [5] and watermark detection with distortion compensated dither modulation (DC-DM) schemes
[6].
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2A. Motivations from the application side
The trade-off between payload of the hidden message and robustness is a well known fact in watermarking. The
main rationale for zero-bit watermarking is that maximum robustness that a watermarking primitive can inherently
offer, is expected as the payload is reduced to the minimum. Here are two application scenarios where zero-bit
watermarking might be sufficient, ie. it is not necessary to hide a message, but just the presence of a mark.
Some copy protection platforms [7] use watermarks as flags whose presence warns compliant devices that the
piece of content they are dealing with, is a copyrighted material. Content access and copy protection are tackled by
cryptographic primitives. Watermarking just prevents the ‘analog hole’ [8]–[10]. In other words, compliant devices
expect three kinds of content: commercial contents which are encrypted and watermarked, free contents which
are in the clear and not watermarked, and pirated contents through the ‘analog hole’ which are in the clear but
watermarked. Although most of DRM systems hide a message like a copy status, we have seen here that the
presence of a mark is indeed sufficient.
Copyright protection is the most famous application of watermarking. However, hiding the name of the author
in his Work is just a fact having no legal value. In Europe, the author first must be a member of an author society,
then he registers his Work. The only legal proof is to give evidence that the suspicious image is indeed a version
of a Work duly registered in an author society’s database. Consequently, this is a yes/no question, which can be
solved by detecting the presence or absence of a watermark previously embedded by an author society.
In these two applications, the presence of a watermark is not a secret, contrary to a steganographic scenario. The
attacker obviously knows which content is watermarked. In the copy protection application, for instance, there is no
point in attacking a personal video which is a free content, not protected neither by encryption nor by watermarking.
B. Motivations from the scientific side
Zero-bit watermarking is closely related to detection of weak signals in noisy environment: the watermark signal
is embedded in a host signal, unknown to the detector. Its power is very weak compared the one of the host.
Watermarkers resorted to classical elements of detection theory very early. This includes the use of Neyman-
Pearson and Pitman-Noether theorems, calculus of asymptotic efficacy, LMP tests (Locally Most Powerful) [11],
and robust statistics [12].
The priority was at these times to design a better detector than the classical correlation, which is only optimal
for white host signals. To name a few, this includes the works of teams such as Q. Cheng and T. Huang [13], A.
Briassouli and M. Strinzis [14], M. Barni et al. [15]. They assume that the host signals are drawn from a known
pdf (probability density function), and they apply the above-mentioned classical elements of detection theory. X.
Huang and B. Zhang relax this implicit assumption considering that the ‘real’ pdf of the host belongs to a given
family of distributions [16]. Their test is designed to fairly perform for the entire family. This allows to encompass
attacks modifying the pdf within the family.
Another track is to see the host signal as a side information only available at the embedding. Side information
brings huge improvements in watermark decoding. However, its use for zero-bit watermarking has received less
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3interest. Pioneer works are mostly heuristic approaches [4], [17]. More recent works use the binning principle to
achieve zero-bit watermarking [6], [18], although J. Eggers notices that SCS (Scalar Costa Scheme) is less efficient
for zero-bit than for positive rate watermarking scheme [19, Sect. 3.6]. Indeed, Erez et al. prove the optimality of
DC-DM based on lattices (those whose Voronoi region asymptotically tends to an hypersphere) for strictly positive
rate data hiding as far as an additive white noise attack is considered [20]. In the case of zero-rate watermarking,
P. Moulin et al. reasonably conjecture that sparse lattice DC-DM is optimal [21]. For zero-bit watermarking, lattice
DC-DM achieves high performances showing some host interference rejection [6]. However, there is a loss of
efficacy compared to the private setup where the side information is also available at the detector.
At first glance, it would seem that the problem of watermark detection is simpler than the decoding of hidden
symbols, because the decoder’s output belongs to a message space which is bigger than the detector’s range
B = {0, 1}. In other words, whereas watermark detection implies a simple binary hypotheses test, decoding of
watermark is a complex multiple hypotheses test.
Yet, almost no theoretical limit, ie. an equivalent of Costa’s result but for watermark detection, has been shown,
except [22, Sect. 2] which only tackles the Gaussian case. N. Merhav mentioned during the WaCha’05 workshop
in Barcelona, that zero-bit watermarking is a hard problem whose optimal solution is not known for the moment
[2]. Especially, up to now, there is no reason why the binning principle should be optimal, even if, as far as the
author knows from the literature, it has the best performances against an AWGN attack. Yet, DC-DM schemes are
known to be weak against scale gain attack.
II. STRATEGY AND NOTATION
Our goal is not to derive an accurate statistical model of the host signal as done in the above-mentioned prior
works. On contrary, very basic assumptions (Gaussian distribution or flat-host assumption) are in order, allowing
us to stress the major role of side information at the embedding side. While the binning scheme is commonly used
to exploit side information, it is not the only way. Our approach is indeed closer to the theory of weak signal
detection.
A. Embedding side
The embedder transforms an original host signal s into a watermarked content y = f(s) = s+x. The host signal
or channel state s is a vector of n components of the original content, modeled as random variables. The notational
key of the article is to decompose the watermark signal x as a unit power vector w and an amplitude θ.
f(s) = s + x = s+ θw(s). (1)
w is a smooth function from Rn to Rn, with the constraints ES{w(s)} = 0 and ES{‖w(s)‖2} = n. This vector
gives a direction pointing to an acceptance region of Rn, towards which the host signal should be pushed. The scalar
θ controls the gain or amplitude of the watermark signal. Theoretical frameworks often use a constant θ =
√
P ,
where P is the fixed power of x. Yet, in practice, host contents might support different watermark power depending
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4on their individual masking property. This change might even occur within a content, such that we should resort to
a vector θ = (θ1, · · · , θn) gathering positive and small gains affecting each sample. We restrict our study to scalar
gain for the sake of simplicity, but the results of this paper can be easily extended to a vector gain. In this case,
one might consider θ as the average gain.
Both parts of the watermark signal depends on the host content, either through side information, or for some
perceptual reasons. Unfortunately, in blind schemes, side information is not made available at the detection side.
Moreover, we wish to maintain a low detector’s complexity, which prevents the use of a human visual or auditive
system in order to recreate an estimate of θ based on the received content. The only fact the detector knows is
that the watermark amplitude θ is positive and small. We believe this model allows a great flexibility which eases
practical implementations of watermarking schemes.
B. Detection side
Upon receipt of signal r, the detector makes a binary decision: d = 1 (d = 0) means that, according to the
detector, the piece of content under scrutiny is watermarked (resp. it has not been watermarked). There are two
hypotheses: Under hypothesis H0, the detector receives an original content r = r0 = s (see end of subsection I-A
for justifications), whereas under hypothesis H1, the detector receives a watermarked and possibly attacked content
r = r1. Probability of false alarm Pfa and power of the test Pp are given by
Pfa = Pr{d = 1|H0} ; Pp = Pr{d = 1|H1}. (2)
Once again, in zero-bit watermarking, no symbol is transmitted. Our problem is then fundamentally different
from the communication of one bit because, under hypothesis H0, no processing is applied and s, given by Nature,
is directly sent to the detector.
We assume that the detector has the structure of a Neyman-Pearson test. First, it applies a detection function
t mapping from Rn to R. Then, this scalar is compared to a threshold τ : d = 1 if t(r) > τ , d = 0 else. The
threshold is given by the constraint of a significance level α such that Pfa = ED{d|H0} ≤ α. Note that, for a given
detection function, this threshold does not depend on what happens under hypothesis H1 (embedding function w,
watermark’s amplitude θ). Moreover, we assume without loss of generality, that, under hypothesis H0, t(r) is a
centered random variable with unit variance:
ER{t(r)|H0} = 0, Var{t(r)|H0} = 1. (3)
If not the case, it is easy to built the test t˜(r) = (t(r)− ER{t(r)|H0})/
√
Var{t(r)|H0}.
C. Pitman Noether efficacy
In this article, the tests are compared asymptotically for n → +∞. The Pitman-Noether theorem indicates that
the best test has the higher efficacy η, whose general definition is given by [11, Sect. III.C.3]:
η¯ =
(
lim
n→∞
n−mδ
∂m
∂θm
ER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
Var{t(r)|H0}−1/2
) 1
mδ
, (4)
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5where m is the first integer for which the m-th derivative of ER{t(r)|H1} is not null, and δ a positive scalar
such that the limit is not null. In our problem, it is not unreasonable to assume m = 1 and δ = 1/2 because the
expectation of the detection function grows with
√
n as Var{t(r)|H0} has been set to one for all n. This is at least
true for well known watermarking schemes. We are not able to find a counter-example, ie. a watermarking scheme
having a better growth rate than
√
n. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to δ = 1/2.
The Pitman Noether theorem holds for composite one-sided hypothesis test. In Sect. II-A, motivations clearly
show that our problem is not a simple hypothesis test (H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ =
√
P fixed), but a composite
one-sided hypothesis test (H0 : θ = 0 versus H1 : θ > 0).
Last but not least, the proof of this theorem is based on an asymptotic study where the alternative hypothesis
H1 has a vanishing parameter θn = kn−δ, with k a positive constant. Important assumptions are the following
regularity conditions:
lim
n→∞
(
∂
∂θ
ER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=θn
/
∂
∂θ
ER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
)
= 1 and lim
n→∞
(Var{t(r|H1)}/Var{t(r)|H0}) = 1,
(5)
and that t(r) − ER{t(r)} tends (convergence in law), as n→ ∞, to a normal variable, both under H1 and under
H0.
We also define the efficiency per element (a.k.a. the differential detector SNR) in the same way as the efficacy
but without the limit, such that in our case:
η =
1
n
[
∂
∂θ
ER{t(r)|H1}
]2
θ=0
. (6)
III. DETECTION OF WEAK SIGNAL DEPENDENT ON SIDE INFORMATION
The goal of this section is to give the expressions for the best detection and the best embedding functions. We
mean ‘best’ in the sense of the Pitman Noether theorem, ie. such as they maximized the efficiency per element.
This section doesn’t consider any attack. Hence, the Pitman Noether theorem considers signals r0 = s and
r1 = y = s + θnw(s), with ES{‖w(s)‖2} = n and θn = k/√n, k > 0. It means that the proof of this theorem
fixes the embedding distortion to DE = θ2nn = k2, but as n increases, the power of the watermarking signal
vanishes.
A. Best detector for a given embedding function
In this subsection, embedding function w is fixed. A well known corollary of the Pitman Noether theorem [11,
Sect. III.C.3] states that the Locally Most Powerful (LMP) test in θ = 0 is asymptotically the best. A Cauchy-
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6Schwarz inequality gives:
∂
∂θ
ER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
∫
Rn
t(r)
∂
∂θ
p(r|H1)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
dr (7)
≤
√∫
Rn
t(r)2p(r|H0)dr
√∫
Rn
p(r|H0)
(
1
p(r|H0)
∂
∂θ
p(r|H1)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
)2
dr (8)
=
√∫
Rn
p(r|H0)
(
1
p(r|H0)
∂
∂θ
p(r|H1)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
)2
dr, (9)
with equality for the LMP test:
t(r) = kt
1
p(r|H0)
∂p(r|H1)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
, (10)
where kt is a positive constant whose role is explained below. The use of the LMP with θ = 0 is reinforced in
practice by the fact the watermark power is very weak compared to the host power.
When there is no attack, p(r|H0) = pS(r) and p(r|H1) = pY(r). We assume there exists θ¯ > 0, such that function
f(s) is invertible at least when 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ¯: s = f−1(y). This allows to write pY(r) = pS(f−1(r))|Jf−1 (r)|, with
the last term being the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of f−1 taken at (r, θ). Developing this last equation (see
Appendix I), we finally get these expressions:
t(r) = −kt∇pS(r)
T
pS(r)
w(r)− ktdiv(w(r)) (11)
= −kt div(pS(r)w(r))
pS(r)
. (12)
The first term of (11) corresponds to the classical non-linear correlation based LMP test [13]–[15], whereas the
second term is not null whenever side information is enabled at the embedding side.
Let Bn(R) be the ball of radius R centered on 0, Sn(R) the associated hypersphere, and E(R) =
∫
Bn(R) t(r)pS(r)dr.
Then, thanks to the Gauss theorem, we have
|E(R)| = kt
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Bn(R)
div(pS(r)w(r))dr
∣∣∣∣∣ (13)
= kt
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
Sn(R)
pS(r)w(r)
T e(r)dr
∣∣∣∣∣ (14)
≤ kt
∫
Sn(R)
pS(r)‖w(r)‖dr, (15)
with e(r) the unit normal vector at position r on Sn(R). E{‖w(r)‖2} < ∞ implies that limR→+∞ E(R) = 0.
This shows that the expectation of the detection function given by (12) is zero under hypothesis H0, as required
in II-B. The constant kt enforces that Var{t(r)|H0} = 1:
kt =
(∫
Rn
1
p(r|H0)
[
∂p(r|H1)
∂θ
]2
θ=0
dr
)−1/2
. (16)
Finally, (6), (10) and (16) give the efficiency per element for such tests:
η = n−1k−2t (17)
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7B. Best embedding function for a given detection function
The detection function t being given (such that t(r0) is a centered random variable with unit variance), we write:
∂
∂θ
ER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= ES
{
∂
∂θ
t(s + θw(s))
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
}
(18)
= ES{w(s)T∇t(s)}. (19)
It appears that, for a given t, it is important to let w(s) ∝ ∇t(s), ∀s ∈ Rn. The efficiency per element is then
upper bounded by the following Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
η =
1
n
(∫
Rn
pS(s)‖w(s)‖‖∇t(s)‖ds
)2
≤
∫
Rn
pS(s)‖∇t(s)‖2ds (20)
with equality when:
w(s) = kw∇t(s) ∀s ∈ Rn, (21)
where kw is a normalizing constant to achieve ES{‖w(s)‖2} = n:
kw =
√
n/ES{‖∇t(s)‖2}. (22)
(20) and (22) give the efficiency per element for such tests:
η = nk−2w = ES{‖∇t(s)‖2}. (23)
C. Synthesis
For the moment, we know how to design the best embedding function for a given detection function, and how to
design the best detection function for a given embedding function. This is reminiscent of the Lloyd-Max algorithm in
quantization. However, dealing with closed form equations, we can insert (21) in (12) yielding a partial differential
equation, that we loosely name ‘fundamental equation of zero-bit watermarking’:
pS(r)t(r) + ktkwdiv(pS(r)∇t(r)) = 0 ∀r ∈ Rn. (24)
Hence, the best couple of detection/embedding functions {t,w} is {t⋆, kw∇t⋆}, with t⋆ a fundamental solution,
ie. a solution of (24). Note that (17) and (23) are still valid. Therefore, it is possible to build a scheme of a given
η (virtually, as high as possible), provided (24) admits a solution with kwkt = η−1. The fundamental equation can
also be written as:
ηt(r) +
∇pS(r)T
pS(r)
∇t(r) +∇2t(r) = 0, (25)
∇2t(r) being the Laplacian of t(r).
D. A geometric property of fundamental solutions
A nice property induced by the fundamental equation is that a pair of its solutions with different efficiencies per
element are orthonormal for the scalar product 〈., .〉 defined here for two functions g and h by:
〈g, h〉 = ER{g(r)h(r)|H0}. (26)
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8Denote L[t] = div(pS(r)∇t(r)). This differential operator is symmetric if
∫
Rn
ti(r)L[tj ](r)dr =
∫
Rn
L[ti](r)tj(r)dr.
In our case,∫
Rn
ti(r)L[tj ](r)dr−
∫
Rn
tj(r)L[ti](r)dr =
∫
Rn
div(pS(r)(ti(r)∇tj(r)− tj(r)∇ti(r)))dr. (27)
The symmetry is enabled for functions ti, tj if the last term, denoted by C, is zero. Let us write it as a limit:
C =
∫
Rn
div(pS(r)(ti(r)∇tj(r)− tj(r)∇ti(r)))dr (28)
= lim
R→∞
∫
Bn(R)
div(pS(r)(ti(r)∇tj(r) − tj(r)∇ti(r)))dr (29)
= lim
R→∞
∫
Sn(R)
pS(r)(ti(r)∇tj(r)T e(r)− tj(r)∇ti(r)T e(r))dr (30)
The Gauss theorem gives the later equation. Assuming that the pdf of the host vanishes more quickly than the norm
‖ti(r)∇tj(r)‖, we suppose in the sequel that the symmetry property is enabled for the solutions of the fundamental
equation. Then, (24) in (27) gives∫
Rn
ti(r)L[tj ](r)dr −
∫
Rn
tj(r)L[ti](r)dr = −
∫
Rn
ti(r).ηjpS(r)tj(r)dr +
∫
Rn
tj(r).ηipS(r)ti(r)dr (31)
= (ηi − ηj)〈ti, tj〉 = 0 (32)
The restriction to normalized detection functions and this last equation imply that 〈ti, tj〉 = δ(j− i) where δ is the
Kronecker delta function. Hence, the solutions of the fundamental equation with different efficiencies per element
constitute a family of orthonormal functions (Subsection IV-B.1 even shows orthonormal functions sharing the same
efficiency), if the symmetry property holds for all pairs of elements of this family.
IV. SOME SOLUTIONS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL EQUATION OF ZERO-BIT WATERMARKING
We are not able to find a general solution of the fundamental equation. However, in some cases, we show some
examples of solution in this section.
A. The scalar case
To avoid multiplication of notation, we use the same letter to denote the scalar version of above-mentioned
vectorial functions.
We suppose here that the host samples are i.i.d. such that pS(s) =
∏n
i=1 pS(si). Moreover, our strategy is to
maintain this statistical independence while embedding the watermark: w(s) = (ǫ1w(s1), · · · , ǫnw(sn))T , where
ǫ is a secret vector, with for instance, ǫi = ±1 ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}. (11) shows that the detection function is indeed
a sum t(r) =
∑n
i=1 ǫit(ri); and (25) boils down to a scalar second-order ordinary differential equation with non
constant coefficients:
ηt(r) +
p′S(r)
pS(r)
t′(r) + t′′(r) = 0. (33)
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9TABLE I
POLYNOMIAL SOLUTIONS OF THE SCALAR GAUSSIAN CASE s ∼ N (0, 1).
η w(s) t(r) Var{t(r)|H1}
1 1 r 1
2 s −1+r
2
√
2
(1 + θ)4
3 −1+s
2
√
2
−3r+r3√
6
1 + 66θ2 +O(θ4)
4 −3s+s
3
√
6
3−6r2+r4
2
√
6
1 + 12
√
6θ + 608θ2 + O(θ3)
5 3−6s
2
+s4
2
√
6
15r−10r3+r5
2
√
30
1 + 5470θ2 + O(θ4)
6 15s−10s
3
+s5
2
√
30
−15+45r2−15r4+r6
12
√
5
1 + 40
√
30θ + 49122θ2 + O(θ3)
7 −15+45s
2−15s4+s6
12
√
5
−105r+105r3−21r5+r7
12
√
35
1 + 441392θ2 + O(θ4)
1) Gaussian case: Assume that s ∼ N (0, σ2x). (25) becomes even simpler: ηt(r)− rt′(r)/σ2x + t′′(r) = 0. The
solution is a linear combination of two ‘independent’ (ie. their Wronskian is not null) confluent hypergeometric
functions of the first kind taken in r2/2:
t(a)(r) = kt1 .1F1
(
−σ
2
xη
2
,
1
2
,
r2
2σ2x
)
, (34)
t(b)(r) = kt2 .r.1F1
(
1− σ2xη
2
,
3
2
,
r2
2σ2x
)
. (35)
If σ2xη is an even integer, t(a) is a polynomial function. If σ2xη is an odd integer, t(b) is a polynomial function.
Another way to see this is to recognize this later differential equation as the Hermite equation when η is a positive
integer and σ2x = 1. Therefore, if ησ2x = k ∈ N, tk(r) = κkHk(r/σx), Hk being the Hermite polynomial of order
k. This family of polynomials is known to be orthogonal with a weighting function1 exp(−r2/2). In our context,
this is confirmed by (30), which reduces to the value of the integrand on the boundaries on an increasing interval
of R. The condition C = 0 is satisfied because limr→∞ rm exp(−r2/2σ2x) = 0, ∀m ∈ N. In the sequel, we call
this set of fundamental solutions the ‘polynomial family’.
Table IV-A.1 gives the expressions of the first elements of this family and their associated embedding function.
Figure (1) shows a plot of the detection function of these first elements.
The first line of this table is the well known direct spread spectrum scheme with a linear correlator, optimal
detector in the Gaussian i.i.d. case. The second line is known as the proportional or multiplicative embedding, first
proposed in [23, Sect. 4.2] for perceptual reasons (ie., it is known that a greater embedding power is not visible when
watermarking wavelet coefficients with a proportional embedding, in comparison to a simple additive embedding).
A higher efficiency per element is another inherent advantage of proportional embedding. The remaining lines of
this table generalize this idea to new schemes (as far as the author knows).
2) Uniform case: The classical ‘flat-host’ assumption used in DC-DM scheme studies states that the host
pdf is a piecewise constant function. More precisely, we assume here the host pdf can be written as pS(s) =
1This is the probabilists’ definition of Hermite polynomials. However, these polynomials take different forms according to the chosen
standardization. For instance, κk = 1/
√
k! when the coefficient of highest order of Hk is set to 1.
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Fig. 1. Plot of the detection function r → t(r) for the seven first elements of the polynomial family as listed in Table IV-A.1. Darker lines
corresponds to higher orders.
∑+∞
i=−∞ PiΠi(s), with Πi the indicator function of the elementary interval [
π√
η i,
π√
η (i + 1)), and
∑+∞
i=−∞ Pi =
√
η/π. In this case, (25) defined almost everywhere2, is a lot simpler: ηt(r) + t′′(r) = 0, whose obvious solution3
is t(r) =
√
2 cos(
√
ηr) and hence, w(s) = −√2 sin(√ηs). Although these are not exactly the sawtooth embedding
function of the scalar DC-DM (a.k.a. SCS), we find back at least periodic functions.
If the ‘flat-host’ assumption holds on the above partition of R, then it also holds on the finer partition
⋃+∞
i=−∞[
π
k
√
η i,
π
k
√
η (i+
1)), k ∈ N. This gives birth to another fundamental solution tk(r) =
√
2 cos(k
√
ηr), whose efficiency per element
is k2 greater. We call the sinusoidal family the set of fundamental solutions tk indexed with integers. Once again,
elements of this family are orthonormal:
〈tk, tℓ〉 =
∑
i
2Pi
∫ (i+1) pi√
η
i pi√
η
cos(k
√
ηr) cos(ℓ
√
ηr)dr = δ(k − ℓ). (36)
B. The vector case
IV-A uses the cartesian system where the embedding processes in a sample wise manner. We generalize this idea
to block based watermarking schemes assuming there exists an integer p dividing n so that Rn = Rp×Rp · · ·×Rp
and that pS(s) =
∏n/p
i=1 p(s(i−1)p+1, · · · , s(i−1)p+p). If t(p) is a solution of the fundamental equation in Rp with a
given efficiency, then t(n)(r) =
√
p/n
∑n/p
i=1 t
(p)(r(i−1)p+1, · · · , r(i−1)p+p) is a solution in Rn yielding the same
efficiency. This realizes a statistically independent embedding in the sense that the block of p watermark samples
2Except on the boundaries due to discontinuities. This has little importance as the probability that the host signal is on a boundary is zero.
3The other solution {t(r) = √2 sin(√ηr), w(s) = √2 cos(√ηs)} is valid on a shifted partition Si[ pi2√η (2i − 1), pi2√η (2i + 1)).
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only depends on the same block of p host samples. The issue is now on finding solutions t(p). A usual technique
is the separation of variables method in a specific orthogonal coordinate system [24].
1) Separation of variables: Classically, the separation of variables method considers a solution t(p)(r) =∏p
i=1 tηi(ri), where each tηi have to satisfy (33) with their own efficiency ηi. The resulting efficiency of t(p)
is then η =
∑p
i=1 ηi. For white Gaussian hosts, this gives birth to an extension of the polynomial family which is
indeed based on the multivariate Hermite polynomials, indexed by the n/p-uple k ∈ Np: Hk(r) =
∏n/p
i=1Hki(ri).
Two different elements of this family are orthogonal for the scalar product (26), even if they share the same
efficiency per element.
This extension of the polynomial family is illustrated in the following example. If S ∼ N (0, σ2xIn), then
∇pS(r) = −pS(r)r/σ2x, and (24) becomes ηt(r) − rT∇t(r)/σ2x + ∇2t(r) = 0. JANIS, a zero-bit watermarking
scheme heuristically invented some years ago [5], [17], is a fundamental solution. Its detection function is the
following one:
t(r) =
√
p
n
n/p∑
i=1
p∏
j=1
r(i−1)p+j
σx
. (37)
Note that rj appears only once in the detection function, ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , n}. It is easy to see that rT∇t(r) = pt(r)
and ∇2t(r) = 0. Thus, JANIS with order p is a solution to (24) provided that ησ2x = p. This can be interpreted as
follows: this is a block based watermarking scheme built on the p-multivariate Hermite polynomial H(1,··· ,1). This
theoretical framework proves the optimality of the heuristic JANIS scheme.
Separation of variables can be done on another coordinate system. The following spherical coordinate system
(ρ, θ1, · · · , θp−1) is adapted to isotropic host distributions, ie. pS(s) = f(ρ) with ρ = ‖s‖:
r1 = ρ sin θp−1 sin θp−2 · · · sin θ2 sin θ1
r2 = ρ sin θp−1 sin θp−2 · · · sin θ1 cos θ1
r3 = ρ sin θp−1 sin θp−2 · · · cos θ2
.
.
.
rp−1 = ρ sin θp−1 cos θp−2
rp = ρ cos θp−1.
For instance, we seek a function t(r) = t(ρ, θp−1) = U(ρ)V (θp−1), which depends on two simple statistics
ρ =
∑p
i=1 r
2
i and θp−1 = arccos(rT ep/‖r‖). ep is a secret unit vector shared by the embedder and the detector
taken as the p-th element of the canonical basis (ie. in the cartesian coordinate system). Separating variables in
(25) yields two equations:
KV (θ) + (p− 2) cot θV ′(θ) + V ′′(θ) = 0 (38)
(ηρ2 −K)U(ρ) +
(
(p− 1)ρ+ ρ2 f
′(ρ)
f(ρ)
)
U ′(ρ) + ρ2U ′′(ρ) = 0 (39)
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with K ∈ R. The choice U(ρ) = ktρ2 and V (θ) = p cos2 θ− 1 is a solution provided f ′(ρ)/f(ρ) = −ρ/σ2x (white
Gaussian host), K = 2p and ησ2x = 2. The detection function is then
t(r) = kt
(
(
√
prTep)
2 − ‖r‖2) = 1
σ2x
√
2p(p− 1)
(
(p− 1)r2p −
p−1∑
i=1
r2i
)
. (40)
t(r) = τ defines a p-dimensional two-sheet hyperboloid. This is closed to a two-sheet hypercone, acceptance region
of the absolute normalized correlation, which is the optimum detection function based on such simple statistics
for Gaussian white host [3]. We agree here with N. Merhav and E. Sabbag that the acceptance region must be a
two-sheet geometric form contrary to the well-known normalized correlation and its one-sheet hypercone [1]. Yet,
neither the absolute normalized correlation nor the famous normalized correlation are fundamental solutions. We
suppose that this stems from the difference in the models of the perceptual constraint: fixed embedding power vs.
random small and positive gain. Eq.(40) is however not unknown in the watermarking literature. This is the measure
of robustness given in Cox et al. book [1, Eq.(5.13)].
Let us now invent a host such that
P (s ∈ Bp(R)) =


R/R0 , if R ≤ R0
1 , if R > R0.
This extension of the one dimension uniform distribution (in the sense that, in one dimension, a uniform distribution
gives a linear cumulative distribution function over the interval B1(R)) implies that its isotropic pdf equals f(ρ) =
ρ1−p/R0, if 0 < ρ < R0 (0, else). A solution in the form t(r) = U(ρ) must then satisfy ηU(ρ) + U ′′(ρ) = 0,
whose solutions are as follows:
t(a)(ρ) =
√
2surf(Sp(1)) cos(√ηρ) with √ηR0 = 0 [π], (41)
t(b)(ρ) =
√
2surf(Sp(1)) sin(√ηρ) with √ηR0 = 0 [2π]. (42)
surf(Sp(1)) is the surface area of the p-hypersphere of unit radius: surf(Sp(1)) = 2πp/2/Γ(p/2). This solution
looks like the sphere hardening dither modulation scheme invented by F. Balado [25, Sect. 5].
2) Sparsity: Many possible coordinate systems allow a separation of variables [24], but their investigation is
out of the scope of this paper. Preferably, we would like here to rediscover a famous principle in watermarking.
Suppose we know a solution t⋆ to the scalar equation: η⋆t⋆(x)+ f(x)t⋆′(x)+ t⋆′′(x) = 0. We would like to extend
this solution considering a solution in the form: t = t⋆ ◦ g, with g : Rp → R a differentiable function. Gradient and
Laplacian have the following expressions:
∇t(r) = t⋆′(g(r))∇g(r), ∇2t(r) = t⋆′′(g(r))‖∇g(r)‖2 + t⋆′(g(r))∇2g(r). (43)
and the fundamental equation becomes:
t⋆′(g(r))
(
− η
η⋆
f(g(r)) +
∇pS(r)T
pS(r)
∇g(r) +∇2g(r)
)
+ t⋆′′(g(r))
(
‖∇g(r)‖2 − η
η⋆
)
= 0 (44)
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A linear form, ie. a projection g(r) = rTλ, is a solution providing the following simplifications: ∇2g(r) = 0 and
‖∇g(r)‖ = ‖λ‖ . Then, t is a fundamental solution with an efficiency per element η = η⋆‖λ‖2, provided we have:
∇pS(r)T
pS(r)
λ = ‖λ‖2f(rTλ). (45)
For a white Gaussian host, this implies that f(x) = −x‖λ‖−2σ−2x , which is the score (ie. p′(x)/p(x)) associated
to N (0, ‖λ‖2σ2x). Hence, the polynomial family is extended to the vector case with fundamental solutions of the
form tk(r) = κkHk(rTλ/‖λ‖σx) whose efficiency per element is η = k/σ2x.
For the flat host assumption, f appears to be the null function. Hence, the sinusoidal family is extended to the
vector case with fundamental solution of the form t(r) = kt cos(rTλ) whose efficacy is η = ‖λ‖2.
This kind of solutions illustrates the principle known as sparsity or time sharing [26, Sect. 5.2 and 8.2], where
the watermark embedding is processed on the projection rTλ. A typical implementation of this principle is the
Spread Transform Dither Modulation [26, Sect. 5.2].
3) Space partitioning: Under the flat host assumption, (25) reduces to the well known Helmholtz equation:
ηt(r) + ∇2t(r) = 0. Suppose t⋆ is a solution, then the composition of this function by a translation operator
yields another solution: t0(r) = t⋆(r − r0). This property is due to the fact the score ∇pS(r)/pS(r) is invariant
by translation since it is null. One can also mix different solutions defined over a specific region Ci ⊂ Rp:
t(r) =
∑
i ti(r)Πi(r), with Πi(.) the indicator function of region Ci. Assume now, that regions {Ci} constitute a
partition of Rp and that the host pdf is a piecewise constant function such that ps(s) =
∑
i PiΠi(s). Then, the
above mixture is a solution of the fundamental equation, except on the boundaries of contiguous regions where the
gradients of pS and t are a priori not defined.
An elegant way to set a partition is to define the regions as the Voronoi cells of a p-dimension lattice Λ:
Ci = V + ci, ci ∈ Λ and V the Voronoi cell centered on 0. With all these elements, we can write:
t(r) =
∑
i
ti(r)Πi(r) =
∑
ci∈Λ
t⋆(r− ci)Πi(r) = t⋆(r−Q(r)), (46)
with Q(.) the quantization function mapping Rp onto Λ.
Under the flat host assumption, sparsity and space partitioning indeed give the same extension of the sinusoidal
family: tk(r) =
√
2 cos(rTλk), when vector λk is defined by 2πG−Tk, with G the generator matrix of lattice Λ
and k ∈ Np. r belonging to Ci, means that r = ci + r˜ = Gni + r˜, with ni ∈ Zp and r˜ ∈ V . Thus, t(r) = t(r˜)
because nTi k ∈ Z, ∀(k,ni) ∈ Np ×Zp. This gives η = ‖λk‖2 = 4π2‖G−Tk‖2. Once again, this is not exactly the
lattice quantizer based watermarking scheme, but at least we find back solutions which are periodic with respect
to a lattice.
To conclude, the goal of this section is to show that several well-known watermarking schemes are indeed
solutions of the fundamental equation, underlying the unifying character of this theoretical framework.
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V. CONDITIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND EXTENSIONS
A. Conditions
Many assumptions have been made to derive the fundamental equation and we would like to collect and state
them explicitly in this section before providing some limitations and extensions.
First, at the embedding side, the model of the perceptual constraint is based on the masking phenomenon, modeled
as a perceptual gain θ. Whereas this article focuses on a scalar gain for sake of simplicity, in practice, it is likely
to be a vector of positive and small values locally adapting the power of the watermark signal to the power of the
masking effect. The main fact is that this gain is unknown when generating the energy constrained signal w(s), and
unknown at the detection side. This model is quite different than the classical power or energy constraint, which
imposes a fixed amount of embedding distortion.
Second, in this paper, schemes are claimed optimal if they maximize the efficiency per sample. This meaning
of optimality only holds when the Pitman Noether theorem can be applied, ie. for schemes fulfilling the following
regularity assumptions [11, Sect. III.C.3]:
• The energy of the watermark signal and the variance of the tested statistic must be bounded. Without of loss
of generality, we impose ES{‖w(s)‖2} = n and ER{t(r)2} = 1.
• The smoothness conditions on the density p(.|H1) as a function of θ and on the non-linearity t(.) such that
Eq. (5) holds,
• The convergence in law of the statistic t(R) to a normal variable under both hypothesis.
Moreover, we also restrict our study to detection functions defined in Rn at least twice differentiable except on a
zero-measure set to get the existence of its gradient and Laplacian. Then, the above study can be summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose a zero-bit watermarking scheme based on the embedding and detection functions {w(.), t(.)}
satisfies the above-mentioned conditions. Then, this scheme is optimal for a given efficacy η and when there is no
attack, if and only if t(.) is a solution of the fundamental equation (24) and w(s) = kw∇t(s), ∀s ∈ Rn.
The convergence in law to a normal variable is a very restrictive condition. When the host samples are i.i.d. (or
blocked based i.i.d.), a block based embedding gives an elegant solution because its matched detection function is
the sum of n/p i.i.d. random variables. The parameter p must be fixed to ensure the asymptotic normality by the
central limit theorem (as E{t(p)(r)2} < +∞).
Proposition 2: The principle of block based embedding gives birth to two important families of detection
functions: sums of p-multivariate Hermite polynomials for white Gaussian hosts, and sums of cosine functions
periodically defined on p-dimension lattices for flat hosts. Both families gather orthonormal functions for the scalar
product defined by (26).
B. Limitations
The Pitman Noether theorem states that the efficacy is a criterion for optimality only asymptotically. This makes
sense in our study because the watermark signal is deeply embedded in the host, thus requiring spreading of the
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mark on long sequences. In the same way, efficacy is very useful in applications such as passive sonar and radio
astronomy, also dealing with weak signals and long integration times.
Our framework nicely gives a unified theory gathering many known watermarking schemes. However, all new
fundamental solutions may not be adequate for practical implementations where host signals are not so long, or θ
is not so small. We foresee at least two reasons:
• When θ is not so small, the variance under H1 grows very fast with the efficacy, as shown in Appendix II
and in Table IV-A.1.
• The Berry-Esseen theorem shows that the rate of convergence to the normal distribution depends on the third
moment of t(.), which we suspect to be fast increasing with the efficacy.
A proper study requires a non asymptotic analysis of the performances which is out of the scope of this article. Some
experimental works can be found in literature. For instance, the p-multivariate Hermite polynomial based family
of detection functions has been already experimentally tested under the abbreviation JANIS: in [17], the efficacy is
given by the order of the JANIS scheme, ie. η = p. The ROC curve (ie. Pp = Pp(Pfa) for a given embedding gain)
and the ‘power’ curve (ie. Pp = Pp(θ) for a given Pfa) are largely improved compared to performances of spread
spectrum watermarking scheme (see respectively Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 in [17]). However, for a given vector length,
the comparison of the performances based on a normal distribution of the tested statistic with the experimental
measurements clearly mismatch as the efficacy increases and as the parameter θ increases. Hence, whereas the
central limit theorem proves the asymptotic convergence in law needed in the theoretical framework, in any case,
it shall not be used to estimate performances in practice. Another lesson learnt from [17], is that a scheme with
a higher efficacy can perform more poorly than another one in an non asymptotic regime. In Fig. 3 of [17], the
scheme with p = 5 yields a higher power than the one with p = 4 only if Pfa > 10−3, with n = 2400 for both
schemes.
Whereas this study provides a somewhat elegant, constructive and unifying theoretical framework; unfortunately
it doesn’t give clear guidelines on the design of a watermarking scheme in an non asymptotic regime.
C. Extension to asymmetric tests
So far, the main idea of the paper is to take advantage of the knowledge of the host value s to boost the efficiency
per element. This results in the increase of ER{t(r)|H1} = θ√nη + O(θ2), while the variance Var{t(r)|H1} is
maintained at the level of Var{t(r)|H0} at least to the first order. Asymptotically, the test has to make a clear cut
between two distributions having the same variance. This is sometimes called a symmetric test. This subsection
focuses on the variance Var(t(r)|H1). As H. Malvar and D. Florencio did for zero-rate watermarking [27], we
would like to control the value of Var(t(r)|H1), achieving so-called asymmetric tests4.
The watermark signal is already dependent to the host through the vector w(s) which pushes the host towards a
region in space where the detection function has a higher value, ie. hopefully the acceptance region. We add here
4Be careful not to confuse with asymmetric watermarking where the detection key is different from the embedding private key.
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another dependence which modulates the amplitude of this vector: host signals which are naturally far away from the
acceptance region are more strongly pushed than those near the acceptance region. We write the watermark signal
x(s) = θkw(s)w(s). For a fair comparison with the previous sections, the constraint reads: ES{kw(s)2‖w(s)‖2} =
n. The embedding strategy is not changed: w(s) = ∇t(s). Hence, we have:
n = ES{kw(s)2‖∇t(s)‖2} (47)
∂
∂θ
ER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= ES{kw(s)‖∇t(s)‖2} (48)
η =
ES{kw(s)‖∇t(s)‖2}2
ES{kw(s)2‖∇t(s)‖2} (49)
Now, the goal is to choose function kw such that it reduces the variance under H1:
∂
∂θ
Var{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= 2ES{t(s)ν˜(s)} ≥ −2Var{ν(s)}, (50)
where ν(s) = kw(s)‖∇t(s)‖2 such that its centered version is ν˜(s) = ν(s) − ∂∂θER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣
θ=0
. The Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality gives −2Var{ν(s)} as the lower bound, with equality when ν˜(s) = −ct(s), c a positive constant.
Hence, we achieve to reduce Var(t(r)|H1). However, this strategy consumes embedding distortion:
n = ES{kw(s)2‖∇t(s)‖2} = ES{ν(s)2‖∇t(s)‖−2}
= c2ES{t(s)2‖∇t(s)‖−2}+ nηES{‖∇t(s)‖−2} − 2c√nηES{t(s)‖∇t(s)‖−2}. (51)
For the simple cases explored in this paper, we are able to find a bijection s′ = h(s) such that pS(s′)t(s′)‖∇t(s′)‖−2 =
−pS(s)t(s)‖∇t(s)‖−2, which implies a third null term. Denote a = ES{t(s)2‖∇t(s)‖−2} and b = ES{‖∇t(s)‖−2}.
(51) finally reads:
n = ac2 + bnη. (52)
A higher c decreases Var{t(r)|H1} (first order approximation) but also η due to the distortion constraint. In
practice, this strategy brings a crucial issue. Starting from a tested statistic having a symmetric distribution under
both hypotheses, a decrease of Var{t(r)|H1} yields a higher power of test only if ER{t(r)|H1} is greater than
threshold τ > 0. Now, if this is not the case (for instance, due to an attack), then the impact of this strategy is just
the opposite. This phenomenon does not appear in [27], as this article tackles watermark decoding where threshold
τ equals 0, the distributions under H0 (bit 1 has been hidden) and H1 (bit 0 has been hidden) being symmetric
around this value.
Experimental works about this variance reducing embedding strategy applied to the JANIS scheme are summarized
in [5, Sect. 6.4]. It stresses the difficulty in finding an appropriate value of c because it requires to foresee an attack
scenario and its impact on the expectation of the tested statistic. The final rule applied in this experimental paper
is to set c to the value which maximizes the Gaussian estimation of the power of test (which is, once again, a very
poor estimation). Results are mitigated and more complex embedding strategies are investigated in [5, Sect. 6.4].
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VI. ATTACK NOISE
When there is an attack, the received signal under H1 is r1 = a(y). The attack channel a is defined through a con-
ditional probability distribution pa(r1|y), whose associated attack power is σ2a =
∫ ∫ ‖r1−y‖2pa(r1|y)pY(y)dydr1/n.
The parameters of the attack channel are unknown at the detection side. We would like to keep the detection as
simple as possible so that the estimation of these parameters is not tractable in this strategy. The performance of the
detector should degrade slowly with the strength of the attack, according to the definition of robust watermarking
given in [28].
The Pitman Noether might then become useless because there is a disruption between the two hypotheses: H1
doesn’t asymptotically converge to H0, in the sense that the regularity conditions (5) are violated due to the presence
of the attack channel only under H1.
We present here two ways to tackle this problem, changing our framework in order to enforce the Pitman Noether
theorem. A first idea is to restrict our analysis to a fixed WNR (watermark to noise power ratio): θ2n/σ2a = g. The
received signal can be written as: r1 = s + θnw(s) + θng−1/2z˜, with EZ{‖z˜‖2} = n. Therefore, the power of
the difference signal r1 − r0 asymptotically vanishes with θ2n. The second idea considers attacks with fixed DNR
(document -ie. host- to noise power ratio) where signals are corrupted by the same attack under both hypotheses
as T. Liu and P. Moulin did [6]. Yet, the targeted applications as described in our introduction do not a priori
motivate this possibility because the attack of unprotected contents under H0 are clearly unlikely. We argue that a
‘soft’ attack on original pieces of content still produces regular content. The attack channel changes the value of
the feature vectors, but it does not modify their inherent statistical structure.
Under both attack models, the fundamental equation appears to be statistically robust in the sense that it is not
modified by the presence of the attack channel. However, this is only true for very particular conditions as described
in the sequel.
A. Fixed WNR attacks
This subsection only shows that the fundamental equation remains unchanged when the watermarked signals
goes through a fixed WNR AWGN attack channel.
1) Best embedding function for a given detection function: As usual, we write:
∂
∂θ
ER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
∫ ∫
∂
∂θ
t(s + θw(s) + θ
√
gz˜)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
pS(s)pZ˜(z˜)dsdz˜ (53)
=
∫
w(s)T∇t(s)pS(s)ds +
∫ ∫ √
gz˜T∇t(s)pS(s)pZ˜(z˜)dsdz˜ (54)
We assume z˜ is independent of s and centered, so that the second term is null. We find back the same best embedder
as (21).
2) Best detection function for a given embedding function: The pdf of r1 = y+√gθz˜ is given by the following
convolution:
pR1(r) =
∫
pY(u)p√gθZ˜(r− u)du, (55)
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whose derivative is composed of two terms:
∂
∂θ
pR1(r)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
∫
∂
∂θ
pY(u)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
lim
θ→0
p√gθZ˜(r− u)du+
∫
pS(u)
∂
∂θ
p√gθZ˜(r− u)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
du (56)
We assume that z˜ is normal distributed. Then, limθ→0 p√gθZ˜(r − u) is the Dirac distribution. Hence, the first
term is, as detailed in Sect. III-A, ∂/∂θpY(r)|θ=0 = −div(pS(r)w(r)).
The second term is calculated being inspired by some proofs of the De Bruijn’s identity (see [29, Th. 16.6.2]).
It corresponds to the derivative of the pdf of a(s) = s+√gθz˜ with respect to θ. In one hand, we have:
∂
∂θ
pa(S)(r) =
∫
pS(u)
(‖r− u‖2
gθ3
− n
θ
)
p√gθZ˜(r− u)du. (57)
On the other hand, it appears that:
∇2pa(S)(r) =
∫
pS(u)
(‖r− u‖2
g2θ4
− n
gθ2
)
p√gθZ˜(r− u)du =
1
gθ
∂
∂θ
pa(S)(r). (58)
Finally, the second term is null, because
∂
∂θ
pa(S)(r)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= lim
θ→0
gθ∇2pa(S)(r) = 0, (59)
and we find back the same best detection function as (12).
B. Fixed DNR attacks
The framework is changed so that the hypotheses are now: H0 : r0 = a(s) against H1 : r1 = a(s + θw(s)).
What are the impacts of this new framework on the detection and embedding functions?
As already said, our analysis only holds for channel attacks conserving the statistical structure of the host signal.
The restrictions are as follows. For host s ∼ N (0, In), the attack is an SAWGN channel: a(s) = γ(s + z), with
z ∼ N (0, σ2zIn) independent of s and γ = 1/
√
1 + σ2z . The attack is a Wiener filtering for this very simple case,
which maintains p(r|H0) as a normal distribution. For the flat host assumption, the attack is an addition of an
independent noise: a(s) = s+ z. The new expression of p(r|H0) is given by a convolution, which renders the pdf
under H0 even flatter and larger. Consequently, at the scale of the watermarking signal, p(r|H0) is still a piecewise
constant function. The expression (11) of the best detection function given the embedding function is not modified
when restricting to attack channels preserving p(r|H0).
This is not the case for the best embedding function given the detection function. For the class of attack channel
considered in this paper, we can write a(s) = γ(s+z) with γ = 1 for the additive noise attack, and γ = 1/
√
1 + σ2z
for the SAWGN attack. (18) is then modified as follows:
∂
∂θ
ER{t(r)|H1}
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
(γ, σz) =
∫ ∫
∂
∂θ
t(γ(s+ θw(s) + z))
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
pZ(z)pS(s)dzds (60)
=
∫
γw(s)T
(∫
∇t(γ(s + z))pZ(z)dz
)
pS(s)ds. (61)
This last equation shows that the best strategy at the embedding side should set
w(s) ∝ EZ{∇t(γ(s+ z))}. (62)
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This implies that the embedder knows the attack channel parameters. This counter attack may not be realistic in
general, and we keep our former strategy given by (21), so that
η(γ, σz) =
γ2η(1, 0)
n2
(ES{w(s)TEZ{w(γ(s + z))}})2. (63)
However, there are some cases where the counter attack (62) is surprisingly simple because it is indeed identical
to the regular embedding strategy (21) whatever the parameters of the attack channel. This occurs when t is
such that EZ{∇t(γ(s + z))} = h(γ, σz)∇t(s). As a consequence, the fundamental equation (25) derived in the
no attack case, remains valid under these particular attack cases. The efficiency per element is then equal to
η(γ, σz) = γ
2h2(γ, σz)η(1, 0).
For the polynomial family, we rewrite the Wiener filtering denoting z˜ = σ−1z z distributed as N (0, 1) and
α = arccos(γ). A less familiar identity of the Hermite polynomials allows to write:
t′ℓ(γ(s+ z)) = κℓℓHℓ−1(cos(α)s+ sin(α)z˜) = κℓℓ
ℓ−1∑
k=0
(
ℓ−1
k
)
cosk(α) sinℓ−1−k(α)Hk(s)Hℓ−1−k(z˜) (64)
EZ{t′ℓ(γ(s + z))} reduces to EZ˜{t′ℓ(γs+ σzγz˜))} = κℓℓγℓ−1Hℓ−1(s) = γℓ−1t′ℓ(s) because EZ˜{Hk(z˜)} = δ(k).
Consequently, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3: The polynomial family is a set of fundamental solutions for i.i.d. Gaussian hosts and SAWGN
attacks with Wiener filtering, whose efficiency per element is given by η(γ, σz) = ℓγ2ℓ. Wiener filtering means that
γ = (1 + σ2z)
−1/2
.
Two noticeable exemptions are t1 and t2, whose efficiency follows the same rule whatever the value of γ in the
SAWGN channel. Last but not least: the higher the ‘original’ efficiency η(1, 0) = ℓ, the less robust is the scheme
in the sense that η(γ, σz)/η(1, 0) = (1 + σ2Z)−η(1,0) decreases faster with the strength of the attack.
For the sinusoidal family, an additive noise leads to
EZ{t′ℓ(s+ z)} = t′ℓ(s)EZ{cos(ℓ
√
ηz)} − ℓ√2η cos(ℓ√ηs)EZ{sin(ℓ√ηz)}. (65)
The desired property is enable whenever the attack noise has an even pdf which sets the second term to zero. For
instance, the AWGN channel gives EZ{t′ℓ(s + z)} = t′ℓ(s)e−ℓ
√
ησ2z/2
. Consequently, we can state the following
proposition:
Proposition 4: The sinusoidal family is a set of fundamental solutions for flat hosts and additive symmetric noise
attacks. For the AWGN channel attack, its efficiency is given by η(1, σz) = ℓ
√
ηe−ℓ
√
ησ2z
.
Once again, the higher the ‘original’ efficiency η(1, 0), the less robust is the scheme in the sense that η(γ, σz)/η(1, 0) =
e−η(1,0)σ
2
z decreases faster with the strength of the attack.
The same analysis also holds for the extension of the polynomial and sinusoidal family to the vector case. For
instance, JANIS is a solution of the fundamental equation for i.i.d. hosts and SAWGN attack, such that EZ{∇t(γ(s+
z))} = γp−1∇t(s). The Wiener filtering restriction is not necessary as JANIS is based on first order Hermite
polynomials. This gives the following efficiency per element η(γ, σz) = pγ2p which follows the same decreasing rule
as the scalar polynomial family. The extended sinusoidal family follows the same rule: η(1, σz)/η(1, 0) = e−η(1,0)σ
2
z
with η(1, 0) = 4π2‖G−Tk‖2 as shown in Appendix III.
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VII. ABOUT DC-DM WATERMARKING BASED ON LATTICE QUANTIZATION
Our theoretical framework doesn’t succeed in finding back well known DC-DM watermarking schemes based on
lattice quantization, where the detection function is usually defined by an Euclidean distance t(r) = kt‖Q(r)−r‖2,
and the embedding function x(s) = α(Q(s) − s) complies with rule (21). Parameter α is fixed and it plays a
crucial role in the trade-off between the embedding distortion and the inherent robustness of the scheme. Note
that our point of view is very different as we suppose that the host signal is pushed in a direction given by
w(s) = kt∇t(s) = 2kt(Q(s) − s), but the watermark signal x(s) = θw(s) is not deterministic because the
amplitude θ is not fixed.
A. Efficiency without noise
We consider a lattice Λ and a host whose pdf is a piecewise constant function over the partition induced by Λ:
R
p =
⋃
ci∈Λ(V + ci). We study the detection function given by t(r) = kt(‖Q(r)− r‖2 − µ), with Q the quantizer
associated to Λ, and {kt, µ} enforcing a centered unit variance tested statistic under H0:
µ = vol(V)−1
∫
V
‖r‖2dr = I(Λ, 2), (66)
kt = −
(
vol(V)−1
∫
V
‖r‖4dr− µ2
)− 1
2
= −(I(Λ, 4)− I(Λ, 2)2)− 12 . (67)
I(Λ, k) denotes the k-th normalized moment of V , ie. vol(V)−1 ∫V ‖r‖kdr. The embedding function is w(s) =
2kwkt(Q(r)− r), ie. a vector pointing towards the nearest element of the lattice. Constant kw is given by:
kw =
√
n
2kt
√
I(Λ, 2)
. (68)
Finally, (23) gives the following efficiency per element for the noiseless case:
η =
4I(Λ, 2)
I(Λ, 4)− I(Λ, 2)2 . (69)
For a positive scale factor β < 1 giving a finer partition induced by βΛ, we have a higher efficiency ηβΛ = β−2ηΛ.
Therefore, lattices should be compared for partitions with vol(V) = 1. Anyway, finding the optimal lattice giving the
best efficiency is out of the scope of this paper. As an example, for cubic lattice Λ = Zp, V is the centered hypercube
[−1/2, 1/2)p and η = 60. For the two dimension hexagonal lattice A2, whose associated generating matrix is
G = [2 1; 0
√
3]/
√
2
√
3 such that vol(V) = 1, we achieve a higher efficiency per element η = 1800√3/43 ≈ 72.50.
Compared to the square lattice Z2, the ‘more spherical’ of the two lattices is the best, when no attack is considered.
This is surprisingly different from the zero-rate case presented in [21, Sect. 3.3].
Increasing the integer p, there exist lattices with nearly spherical Voronoi cell. Assuming V = Bp(R), the
efficiency reads η = (p+4)(p+2)R−2. Setting R = Γ(p/2+1)1/p/
√
π such that vol(V) = 1, and using Stirling’s
approximation, we achieve a linear efficiency per element: η ≈ 2πep. In view of Sect.V-B, this issue is now whether
we can increase parameter p, which is the size of the blocks. The tested statistic reads in term of the square norm of
a quantization noise of a flat host, which is not asymptotically Gaussian. Once again, we are facing the limitations
of the Pitman Noether theorem: the block based watermarking must be done with a fixed p.
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B. Efficiency of a mixture of fundamental solutions
This section uses the geometric property of III-D to calculate the efficiency per element of a detection function
defined by a mixture of fundamental solutions. Suppose a family of orthonormal fundamental solutions {tj} with
integer indices (this is easily generalized to indices in Np), and create the following detection function t(r) =∑Ω
j=1 ωjtj(r). We have:
ER{t(r)|H0} =
Ω∑
j=1
ωjER{tj(r)|H0} = 0, Var{t(r)|H0} =
Ω∑
j=1
ω2j = 1. (70)
The last equation gives a constraint on the weights {ωj}.
The reader must be aware of two facts. First, we have chosen here to mix some detection functions, but we
could also do the mixture on the embedding functions. Second, this mixture is a priori not a fundamental solution.
Given this mixture, we select the best embedding function w(s) = kw∇t(s). However, it is a priori not true that
the mixture is the best detection function knowing w(s). The mixture of detection functions implies a mixture of
the associated embedding functions, w(s) =
∑Ω
j=1̟jwj(s), but with different weights:
̟j = kwωj
√
ηj(1, 0) and kw = (
Ω∑
j=1
ω2j ηj(1, 0))
−1/2
(23) gives the efficacy when there is no attack:
η(1, 0) =
Ω∑
j=1
ω2j ηj(1, 0). (71)
(63) gives the following efficiency per element under attack,
η(γ, σz) =

 Ω∑
j=1
ωj̟j
√
ηj(γ, σz)


2
=
(∑Ω
j=1 ω
2
j
√
ηj(1, 0)ηj(γ, σz)
)2
∑Ω
j=1 ω
2
j ηj(1, 0)
, (72)
if we suppose that ES{wj(s)EZ{wk(γ(s + z))}} = δ(j − k)n/γ.
√
ηj(γ, σz)/ηj(1, 0), ie. the functions stay
orthogonal even under attack. This assumption considerably simplifies the expression of the efficiency. From Sect.
VI-B, we know this holds for the polynomial family (γ = 1/√1 + σ2z ), and for the sinusoidal family (γ = 1),
because EZ{wk(γ(s+ z))} ∝ wk(s).
It is quite difficult to compare mixtures of fundamental solutions and to derive the optimum weighting. Let us
denote the score gM ({ωj}, γ, σz) =
√
η(1, 0)η(γ, σz) for a mixture with weights {ωj} and gP (η(1, 0), γ, σz) the
same score but for a pure fundamental solution whose efficiency is η(1, 0) =
∑Ω
j=1 ω
2
j ηj(1, 0) when there is no
noise5. These two scores are equal when there is no noise, otherwise they have the following expressions:
gM ({ωj}, γ, σz) =
Ω∑
j=1
ω2j ηj(1, 0)γhj(γ, σz) (73)
gP (η(1, 0), γ, σz) = η(1, 0)γh(γ, σz), (74)
5Such fundamental solution might not exist for all weight distributions. For instance, the polynomial family requires that η(1, 0)σ2x ∈ N.
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where function h is defined in VI-B. If the embedder knows the parameters of the attack noise, then the optimum
weighting is given by a simplex optimization: ωj = δ(j−j⋆) with j⋆ = argmaxj ηj(1, 0)γhj(γ, σz). Otherwise, we
set the following criterion: GM ({ωj}) =
∫ 1
0
∫ +∞
0
gM ({ωj}, γ, σz)dσzdγ. This represents the average performance
of the mixture when no prior about the attack noise parameters is given.
For the sinusoidal family, (72) holds if γ = 1. The integration only made over σz gives:
GM ({ωj}) =
√
π
2
Ω∑
j=1
ω2j
√
ηj(1, 0) ≤
√
π
2
√
η(1, 0) = GP (η(1, 0)). (75)
The inequality is due to the concavity of the square root function and it holds for any weight distribution. In the
same way, for the polynomial family, (72) holds if γ = (1 + σ2z)−1/2. The integration only made over γ gives:
GM ({ωj}) =
Ω∑
j=1
ω2j
ηj(1, 0)
ηj(1, 0) + 1
≤ η(1, 0)
η(1, 0) + 1
= GP (η(1, 0)). (76)
The inequality is due to the concavity of the function x → x/(1 + x) on [0,+∞) and it holds for any weight
distribution.
This tends to show that a pure fundamental solution is on average more robust than any mixture of fundamental
solutions. However, this is not a general proof. We have shown this only for the sinusoidal and the polynomial
families when considering attacks such that (72) holds and when h(γ, σz) has a known expression.
C. Application to DC-DM watermarking
Mixture is a tool which renders the study of some watermarking schemes easier. When applied on elements
of the sinusoidal family, this allows to recreate whatever periodic detection function. For instance, the following
weights ωj = −(−1)j3
√
10/π2/j2 give the Fourier series decomposition of the SCS scheme:
t(s) = −6
√
5
π2
∞∑
j=1
(−1)j
j2
cos(j
√
ηs) =
√
5
2
− (s−Q(s))2 6
√
5
∆2
(77)
w(s) = kw
6
√
5η
π2
∞∑
j=1
(−1)j
j
sin(j
√
ηs) = −(s−Q(s))
√
12
∆
(78)
with Q a quantizer whose step is ∆ = 2π/√η. The application of (72) gives the efficiency of SCS under an AWGN
attack, which is otherwise cumbersome to calculate with the direct expressions of t and w. Here, we simply have:
ηSCS(1, σz) =
90η
π4
.
(
∑∞
j=1 j
−2e−j
2 ησ
2
z
2 )2∑∞
j=1 j
−2 =
60
∆2

1 + 6σ2Z
∆2
− 3
π
∫ 2piσ2z
∆2
0
ϑ3(0, e
−πu)du


2
, (79)
where ϑ3 is the third Jacobi theta function. When there is no attack, ηSCS(1, 0) = 60/∆2 = 15η/π2 ≈ 1.52η. Fig.
(2) shows the efficiency per element of SCS with σz ranging from 0 to 1 for η = 1. It shows that the efficiency per
element of a pure sinusoidal function starting from the same value, ie. ηSCS(1, 0), is largely more robust in this
range of noise. However, when the variance of the noise increases, the asymptotic behavior of (79) is dominated
by the first term, j = 1, ie. e−ησ2z , whereas the efficiency of the previous pure sinusoidal function has a stronger
exponential decay: e−1.52ησ2z . In this asymptotic case, a pure sinusoidal function with efficacy η performs better.
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Fig. 2. Efficiency per element of the SCS scheme under AWGN attack against σz . The grey plots are the approximations by (79) for
jmax = {3, 5, 10, 20, 100}. The dotted line is the efficiency of the sinusoidal solution with η(1, 0) = 1, 52.
In the same way, the detection function based on lattice quantizer of Sect. VII-A can be decomposed through a
Fourier series over lattice Λ, whose generator matrix is G:
t(r) = I(Λ, 2) +
√
2
∑
k∈Np
ωk cos(2πr
TG−Tk), (80)
with ωk =
√
2vol(V)−1 ∫V ‖r‖2 cos(2πrTG−Tk)dr. This decomposition in Fourier series may not be easy to
obtain except for low dimension lattices. Yet, whatever the resulting weight distribution, the mixture has for
η(1, σz), gM ({ωk}, γ, σz), and GM ({ωk}) equivalent expressions as for the one dimensional case thanks to the
common expression of the efficiency as shown in Appendix III. Therefore, the main conclusion is still valid: under
an AWGN attack, a pure sinusoidal solution sharing the same efficiency without noise, performs better on average.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Rewriting classical elements of detection theory with the assumption that the watermark signal depends on
the host gives us the expression of the best embedding function knowing the detector. Coupling this result with
the expression of the LMP test gives a partial differential equation we named ‘fundamental equation’ of zero-bit
watermarking. Its main advantage is to offer a constructive theoretical framework unifying most of the watermarking
schemes the community knows. Moreover, a side product is that the decomposition onto a family of orthogonal
fundamental solutions provide an easier way to characterize the performance of DC-DM schemes.
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APPENDIX I
LMP TEST
For a given embedding function w, we derive the Locally Most Powerful test, whose detection function is defined
as:
t(r) =
kt
pS(r)
∂p(r|H1)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
. (81)
θ → 0 makes function f invertible: s = f−1(y), and p(r|H1) = pS(f−1(r))|Jf−1 (r, θ)|, with the last term being
the Jacobian of f−1. Finally, the detection function is:
t(r) =
kt
pS(r)
(
∇pS(f−1(r))T ∂f
−1
∂θ
(r)|Jf−1 (r, θ)|+ pS(f−1(r))∂|Jf
−1(r, θ)|
∂θ
)
θ=0
(82)
=
kt
pS(r)
(A(r) +B(r)). (83)
Some simple equations are:
f(s)|θ=0 = s, (84)
f−1(y)
∣∣
θ=0
= y, (85)
f−1(y) = y − θw(f−1(y)). (86)
A. Expression of A(r)
Deriving this last expression gives:
∂f−1
∂θ
(y) = −w(f−1(y)) − θJw(f−1(y))∂f
−1
∂θ
(y). (87)
Hence,
∂f−1
∂θ
(y)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= −w(y). (88)
The elements of the Jacobian matrix are given by:
[Jf−1(y, θ)](i, j) =
∂f−1i
∂yj
= δ(i− j)− θ∇wi(f−1(y))T Jf−1(y)ej . (89)
The simplification taking θ = 0 yields |Jf−1(y, 0)| = 1, and the expression of A is as follows:
A(r) = −∇pS(r)Tw(r). (90)
B. Expression of B(r)
This term implies the derivative of the determinant of matrix Jf−1(r, θ) which is invertible as θ → 0:
∂|Jf−1 |
∂θ
(r, θ) = |Jf−1(r, θ)|tr(Jf−1(r, θ)−1 ∂Jf
−1
∂θ
(r, θ)) (91)
Taking θ = 0 gives:
∂|Jf−1 |
∂θ
(r, 0) = tr
(
∂Jf−1
∂θ
(r, 0)
)
. (92)
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The derivative of (89) gives the elements of matrix ∂Jf−1∂θ (r, θ):
∂2f−1i
∂θ∂yj
(r, θ) = −∇wi(f−1(r))T Jf−1(r, θ)ej − θ ∂∂θ (∇wi(f
−1(r))T Jf−1(r, θ)ej). (93)
So that, these elements are equal to −∇wi(r)T ej when θ = 0, and, finally, B(r) = −pS(r)div(w(r)).
APPENDIX II
MACLAURIN SERIES OF VAR{t(r)|H1} WITHOUT ATTACK.
We make the Maclaurin series of t(s+ θw(s))2, and take the expectation:
ES{t(s+ θw(s))2} = 1 + 2θES{w(s)t′(s)t(s)} + θ2ES{w(s)2(t′(s)2 + t(s)t′′(s))}+O(θ3). (94)
If t is an odd function, then t′ and w = kwt′ are even functions. The second term of the series is null. If t is an
even function, the second term is not null as shown in Table IV-A.1.
A. First order term for even polynomial function
An even polynomial detection function means t(s) = κkHk(s), with k even and κk = k!−1/2 (probabilists’ defi-
nition). Then, t′(s) = κkkHk−1(s) and w(s) = kwκkkHk−1(s) = κk−1Hk−1(s). Therefore, ES{w(s)t′(s)t(s)} =
κ2kκk−1kES{Hk(s)Hk−1(s)2}. A known formula of the square of Hermite polynomials is the following one:
Hk−1(s)2 =
k−1∑
ℓ=0
(
k−1
ℓ
)2
ℓ!H2k−2−2ℓ(s) (95)
The orthogonality of the Hermite polynomial family allows us to conclude that:
ES{w(s)t′(s)t(s)} = κ2kκk−1k
(
k−1
k/2−1
)2
(k/2− 1)!k! =
√
(k − 1)!k!
(k/2− 1)!(k/2!)2 . (96)
The application of the Stirling approximation, when k is large, gives ES{w(s)t′(s)t(s)} ≈
√
2/e(2π)−3/423k/2k−1/4.
The derivation of the second order term is tackled in the following section.
B. Second order term
In a similar way, we have:
w(s)2t′2(s) =
k
(k − 1)!2
(
k−1∑
ℓ=0
(
k−1
ℓ
)2
ℓ!H2k−2−2ℓ(s)
)2
, (97)
whose expectation, thanks to the orthogonality feature, simplifies to:
ES{w(s)2t′2(s)} = k
(k − 1)!2
k−1∑
ℓ=0
(
k−1
ℓ
)4
ℓ!2(2k − 2− 2ℓ)! (98)
The second term is slightly different:
w(s)2t′′(s)t(s) =
k(k − 1)
k!(k − 1)!Hk−1(s)
2Hk(s)Hk−2(s), (99)
=
k(k − 1)
k!(k − 1)!
(
k−1∑
ℓ=0
(
k−1
ℓ
)2
ℓ!H2k−2−2ℓ(s)
)(
k−2∑
ℓ=0
(
k
ℓ
) (
k−2
ℓ
)
ℓ!H2k−2−2ℓ(s)
)
, (100)
=
k2
k!(k − 1)!
(
k−1∑
ℓ=0
(
k−1
ℓ
)2
ℓ!H2k−2−2ℓ(s)
)(
k−2∑
ℓ=0
k − ℓ− 1
k − ℓ
(
k−1
ℓ
)2
ℓ!H2k−2−2ℓ(s)
)
,(101)
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whose expectation is
ES{w(s)2t′′(s)t(s)} = k
(k − 1)!2
k−2∑
ℓ=0
(
1− 1
k − ℓ
)(
k−1
ℓ
)4
ℓ!2(2k − 2− 2ℓ)!. (102)
C. Final expression
Withdrawing the square of ER{t(r)|H1} =
√
kθ +O(θ2), we get:
Var {t(r)|H1} = (103)
1 +2mod(k + 1, 2)θ
√
(k − 1)!k!
(k/2− 1)!(k/2)!2 + θ
2 k
(k − 1)!2
k−2∑
ℓ=0
(
2− 1
k − ℓ
)(
k−1
ℓ
)4
ℓ!2(2k − 2− 2ℓ)! +O(θ3).104)
APPENDIX III
EFFICACY OF THE EXTENDED SINUSOIDAL FAMILY UNDER AWGN ATTACK
We have ∇t(r) = −√2 sin(rTλk)λk. Therefore:
EZ{∇t(r+ z)} = −
√
2(sin(rTλk)EZ{cos(zTλk)}+ cos(rTλk)EZ{sin(zTλk)})λk (105)
The last term is null when the pdf of Z is odd (ie. pZ(z) = pZ(−z)) because sin(zTλk) is even. Thus, if
Z ∼ N (0, σ2zI), then EZ{∇t(r+ z)} = h(1, σz)t(r), with
h(1, σz) = EZ{cos(zTλk)} (106)
= EZ{cos(
p∑
i=1
ziλk,i)} (107)
= EZ1{cos(z1λk,1)}EZ{cos(
p∑
i=2
ziλk,i)} − EZ1{sin(z1λk,1)}EZ{sin(
p∑
i=2
ziλk,i)} (108)
= e−λ
2
k,1σ
2
z/2EZ{cos(
p∑
i=2
ziλk,i)} (109)
Repeating p− 1 times the last two lines, we finally get:
h(1, σz) = e
−‖λk‖2σ2z/2 = e−η(1,0)σ
2
z/2 (110)
Therefore: η(1, σz) = η(1, 0)e−η(1,0)σ
2
z
.
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